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THE VICTIM'S RIGHTS AMENDMENT: A PROSECUTOR'S,
AND SURPRISINGLY, A DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S
SUPPORT IN SENTENCING
JUDGE STEVEN I. PLATT*
JEANNIE PITTILLo KAUFFMAN**
INTRODUCTION
Since the early eighties, prosecutors in Maryland have
sought to buttress their arguments for the maximum or lengthy
sentences for convicted criminals, by suggesting that the plight of
the victims, or in homicide cases, the victim's family, compelled
such a sentence under the Victim's Rights Act.' This argument,
* Circuit Court Judge for Prince George's County, Maryland, Seventh Judicial Cir-
cuit. B.A., University of Virginia; J.D., Washington College of Law, American University.
** J.D., University of Maryland School of Law; B.A., University of Maryland.
1. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 780 (1996). The Code states, in part:
(a) In generaL-In every case resulting in serious physical injury or death, the
victim or a member of the victim's immediate family, or if the victim is deceased,
under a mental, physical, or legal disability, or otherwise unable to provide the
required information, the personal representative, guardian, or committee, or
other family member may, at the request of the State's Attorney and in the discre-
tion of the sentencing judge, address the sentencing judge or jury under oath or
affirmation before the imposition of sentence.
Id. § 780(a). The Code further provides for a presentence investigation and the prepara-
tion of a victim impact statement. It states:
(c) Same-Request from court; victim impact statement.-(1) Prior to the sen-
tence by the circuit court of any county to the jurisdiction of the Division of Cor-
rection of a defendant convicted of a felony, or a misdemeanor which resulted in
serious physical injury or death to the victim, or the referral of any defendant to
the Patuxent Institution, the court may order the Division of Parole and Proba-
tion to complete a presentence investigation if the court is satisfied that the inves-
tigation would help the sentencing process. The burden of establishing that the
presentence investigation should be ordered is on the party that requests the
investigation.
(2) A presentence investigation shall include a victim impact statement if
required under Article 27, § 781 of the Code . . .
(d) Same-Cases involving death penalty or life imprisonment.-In any case in
which the death penalty or imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole
is requested under Article 27, § 412, a presentence investigation, including a vic-
tim impact statement as provided under Article 27, § 781 of the Code, shall be
completed by the Division of Parole and Probation, and shall be considered by
the court orjury before whom the separate sentencing proceeding is conducted
under Article 27, § 412 or § 413.
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no doubt, has been persuasive in a large number of cases.2
Interestingly, when the purpose of the Act is closely scrutinized
and applied to a number of specific case scenarios, it becomes evi-
dent, particularly in post-sentencing and judgment proceedings, that
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609 (1997). The Code also specifies under what circumstances
a victim impact statement is required, establishes the proper content of an impact state-
ment, and requires the sentencing court to consider the statement:
(a) Mhen required.-A presentence investigation that is completed by the Divi-
sion of Parole and Probation under Article 41, § 4-609 of the Code shall include a
victim impact statement, if:
(1) The defendant, in committing a felony, caused physical, psychological, or
economic injury to the victim; or
(2) The defendant, in committing a misdemeanor, caused serious physical
injury or death to the victim.
(b) When no presentence investigation order.-If the court does not order a
presentence investigation, the State's Attorney may prepare a victim impact state-
ment to be submitted to the court and the defendant in accordance with the
Maryland Rules of Procedure pertaining to presentence investigations.
(c) Consideration of statement by court.-The court shall consider the victim
impact statement in determining the appropriate sentence, and in entering any
order of restitution to the victim under § 807(c) of this subtitle.
(d) Contents.-A victim impact statement shall:
(1) Identify the victim of the offense;
(2) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the
offense;
(3) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the of-
fense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(4) Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relation-
ships as a result of the offense;
(5) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or
the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(6) Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon
the victim or the victim's family that the court requires.
(e) Deceased or incompetent victim.-If the victim is deceased, under a mental,
physical, or legal disability, or otherwise unable to provide the information re-
quired under this section, the information may be obtained from the personal
representative, guardian, or committee, or such family members as may be
necessary.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 781 (1996).
2. See Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 192-93, 699 A.2d 1170, 1189-91 (1997) (upholding
the trial court's sentence of death and rejecting the appellant's argument that the testi-
mony of the victim's mother, which extended beyond the crime's impact on immediate
family members, was improper); Cianos v. State, 338 Md. 406, 413, 659 A.2d 291, 295
(1995) (declaring that "trial judges must give appropriate consideration to the impact of
crime upon the victims"); Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 688-89, 637 A.2d 117, 131-32 (1994)
(rejecting the appellant's argument that the written victim impact statement made by the
victim's sister was unduly inflammatory thereby rendering the trial "fundamentally unfair"
so as to deny the appellant due process); Ingoglia v. State, 102 Md. App. 659, 669-71, 651
A.2d 409, 413-15 (1995) (concluding that consideration of the recommendation of the
victim's mother is "within the sentencing court's prerogatives"); Hurley v. State, 60 Md.
App. 539, 564, 483 A.2d 1298, 1311 (1984) (noting that "[i]n assessing the gravity of the
offense, a proper consideration is the effect the crime has had upon the victims").
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the Act may also be applied in a manner that supports a defense attor-
ney's argument for a reduction or modification of sentencing.3 De-
spite the fact that the legislative history of the Act does not reflect any
intent or even mention that its purpose might include an application
to benefit a sentenced defendant to reduce his sentence,' interpreting
the Act in this manner is consistent with its stated purposes as ex-
plained in Maryland case law.5
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
In 1982, the Maryland General Assembly passed legislation in re-
sponse to the growing concern of crime victims, who felt they were
being treated poorly by the criminal justice system.6 This legislation,
now part of the Maryland Code, authorizes a "Victim Impact State-
ment" to be submitted to the judge along with the Pre-Sentence Inves-
tigation Report prior to the sentencing of a defendant.7 The Code
also specifically provides for victims to be able to make an oral state-
ment to the judge at the time of sentencing.'
In fact, a victim and/or a family member of a victim are given the
opportunity to testify orally before sentencing. The relevant Maryland
Code provides:
3. See State v. Gerhold, No. CT882529X (7thJud. Cir. Ct. Md. Apr. 8, 1999) (consider-
ing testimony of a victim's adult children for the purpose of reconsidering a sentence
imposed upon their father, who was convicted ten years earlier for the murder of their
mother). Maryland Rule 4-345 proscribes the power of Maryland trial courts to revise a
sentence in a criminal case as follows:
The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed
within 90 days after its imposition . . . (2) in a circuit court, whether or not an
appeal has been filed. Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over
the sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, or as provided in section
(d) of this Rule. The court may not increase a sentence after the sentence has
been imposed, except that it may correct an evident mistake in the announce-
ment of a sentence if the correction is made on the record before the defendant
leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceeding.
MD. RULE 4-345(b).
4. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Cianos, 338 Md. at 413, 659 A.2d at 295 (stating that victim impact state-
ments should be accepted "whenever possible").
6. See generally Hearings on SB 50 Before the Maryland Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee,
388 Legis. 1982 Sess. (Md.) (testimony in support) (emphasizing the necessity for the
courts to take into account the psychological impact of crime on victims when sentencing
defendants).
7. See Victim Impact Statement Act, ch. 494, 1982 Md. Laws 3108, 3109 (codified as
amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4609 (1997)); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609 (1997);
see supra note 1 (providing the relevant text of section 4-609).
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 780(a) (1996).
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In every case resulting in serious physical injury or death, the
victim or a member of the victim's immediate family ...
may, at the request of the State's Attorney and in the discre-
tion of the sentencing judge, address the sentencing judge
or jury under oath or affirmation before the imposition of
sentence. 9
On January 19, 1982, a hearing was held before the State Senate
Judicial Proceedings Committee where then State Senator John J.
Garrity, who later became a judge of the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, emphasized that the purpose behind the legislation was to
provide for greater victim involvement in the sentencing proceed-
ings.' ° The Senator stated that although he realized most judges al-
ready give consideration to the impact on victims in determining
sentence, "[t]his bill asks that every judge make this consideration
.... There should be some place in the sentencing procedure to view
the victim with compassion and assess the harm done, . . . the extent
of that harm should be the factor to be considered when sentencing is
determined.""
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has interpreted the legislation
to mandate that "trial judges must give appropriate consideration to
the impact of crime upon the victims."12 Moreover, the court has held
that the impact of a crime on the victim or on the victim's family is
both "relevant and probative."' 3 Because it is unclear how probative
testimony from friends of the victim may be, generally any impact tes-
timony given at the time of sentencing is limited to the victim and to
close family members.' 4
9. Id.
10. Hearing on SB 50 Before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm., 388 Legis. 1982 Sess.
(Md.) (statement of Senator John Garrity).
11. Id.
12. Cianos v. State, 338 Md. 406, 413, 659 A.2d 291, 295 (1995).
13. Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 687, 637 A.2d 117, 130 (1994) (referring to the court's
obiter dicta in Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985) (examining the legisla-
tive history of victim impact statements)).
14. See Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 198, 699 A.2d 1170, 1190 (1997). In Ball, the court
was faced with the issue of whether the testimony of the victim's mother was improper due
to its references to the impact on those outside the immediate family. Id. at 166, 699 A.2d
at 1174. A contrast was made between the strict provisions of MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 781(d) (1996) concerning written impact statements in the presentence investigation
report, and the oral testimony permitted at the time of sentencing under MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 780 (1996). See Ball, 347 Md. at 193-94, 699 A.2d at 1187-88. The court found
that because the victim impact witnesses were testifying "under great emotional strain, ...
in venting their pain and frustration, [they] may make an occasional reference to the im-
pact of the crime on individuals beyond the victim's family." Id. at 197, 699 A.2d at 1189.
This situation is not to be confused with the court's comments regarding the submis-
sion of victim impact statements by friends and colleagues. Although the court ultimately
20001
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Generally, a victim impact statement provides the sentencing
judge with a description of the physical, emotional, and psychological
effects of the crime. t5 Traditional policy justifications for allowing vic-
tim impact statements to be considered by the judge at sentencing
include: giving victims more control of their lives; satisfying a victim's
desire for retribution; and making the criminal sentencing proceed-
ing more fair by giving consideration to the victim's needs.16
II. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE GERHOLD CASE WHERE THE
ACT WAS USED TO BENEFIT THE DEFENDANT
Giving consideration to all of the preceding history concerning a
victim's right to give oral testimony at the time of sentencing, the Cir-
did not have to decide the issue of whether such statements constituted proper victim
impact evidence, it stated that "[e]ven if we were to agree with Appellant that the letters
from friends and colleagues were not proper victim impact evidence .... it would be of no
favorable consequence to Appellant" due to the fact that the letters were never even of-
fered into evidence by the State. Id. at 194, 699 A.2d at 1188.
The court in Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 679 A.2d 1106 (1996), however, did ad-
dress this second issue more directly. While the court did not permit the admission of
written statements made by friends and colleagues of the victims because they were not
properly "incorporated as part of a [presentence investigation] prepared pursuant to
§ 4-609(d)," the court stressed that "we do not mean to rule out the possibility that infor-
mation from friends or colleagues of a victim might be considered in the sentencing phase
of a death penalty case." Williams, 342 Md. at 763, 679 A.2d at 1126. The court noted that
the Division of Parole and Probation has "wide latitude in preparing such reports," how-
ever, "the only written victim impact statements that are admissible in death penalty cases
are those made part of a [presentence investigation] prepared by the Division of Parole
and Probation as authorized by Art. 41, § 4-609(d)." Id. at 763, 679 A.2d at 1126.
The court distinguished Williams from its earlier decision in Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811,
490 A.2d 1289 (1985), in which the court had declared that the then controlling statute,
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 41, § 124 (1982) (recodified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609
(1990)), "does not prevent additional statements or comments from being offered whether
by the victim, his family or the State's Attorney." Reid, 302 Md. at 821, 490 A.2d at 1294. In
Williams, the court stated that the reasoning in Reid
does not apply in the instant case. Reid was not a death penalty case. As we have
explained, the admissibility of victim impact statements in death penalty cases is
specifically governed by Art. 41, § 4-609(d), which requires that the Division of
Parole and Probation prepare a PSI and victim impact statement in every death
penalty case. Our decision in Reid was based on a prior version of the PSI statute
which did not include the provision mandating the preparation of a presentence
investigation and victim impact statement by the Division of Parole and Probation
in all capital cases.
Williams, 342 Md. at 764, 679 A.2d at 1126.
15. See generally Ilana Subar, Note, Emphasizing Victims' Rights at the Sentencing Phase of
Criminal Proceedings, 55 MD. L. REv. 722 (1996) (reviewing Cianos and commenting on the
history of victim impact statements).
16. See id. at 726 n.26 (citing Michael A. Johnson, Note, The Application of Victim Impact
Statements in Capital Cases in the Aftermath ofBooth v. Maryland: An Impact no More?, 13 T.
MARSHALL L. REv. 109, 113-15 (1988))
THE VICTIM'S RIGHTS AMENDMENT
cuit Court for Prince George's County was recently presented with a
set of unusual circumstances that opened the door for the court to
apply the Maryland Victim's Rights Amendment in a manner that was
mutually beneficial to the defendant and to the family members of the
victim.17 This opportunity presented itself by way of a Motion for Re-
consideration/Modification of Sentence filed by counsel on behalf of
a defendant who had been convicted and sentenced for the murder of
his wife, ten years earlier. The facts of the original case are as follows:
The Defendant, Lee Drury Gerhold, was married to Virginia
Gerhold, the victim in this case."8 On Wednesday evening, Febru-
ary 7, 1968, the children of the Defendant, and his then wife,
Virginia Gerhold, were attending a weekly church function. At 7:30
that evening, Virginia Gerhold left the family home on Riggs Road
in Adelphi, Maryland to pick up the children from the church event.
Neighbors observed Virginia Gerhold leaving the home in her white
Ford station wagon. This was the last time Virginia Gerhold was
seen alive.
At 10:30 P.M., February 7th, the Defendant, Lee Drury
Gerhold, reported to the police that his wife was missing and had
failed to return home with the children. On the morning of February
8, 1968 Prince George's County police officers began conducting a
search for Virginia Gerhold and shortly thereafter discovered her car
at 2402 Mistletoe Place, a dead-end street in Adelphi, Maryland.
Virginia Gerhold's body was discovered in the backseat. It appeared
as if she had been sexually assaulted. Upon an autopsy, it was deter-
mined that the victim had died from two gunshot wounds, one to the
head and one to the chest. The autopsy also revealed evidence of
strangulation and lacerations on Virginia Gerhold's face, and on
the back of her head. The facial lacerations were consistent with the
type of injuries that could be inflicted by the muzzle of a handgun.
During the time immediately leading up to the death of Virginia
Gerhold, the Defendant, Lee Gerhold, was involved in an extramari-
tal affair with a woman who had become pregnant with his child.
At the time the murder of Virginia Gerhold occurred, the Defendant
was dining with his mistress at a restaurant in Prince Georges
County.
For the next twenty years, the murder of Virginia Gerhold went
unsolved. The Defendant went on with his life, married his preg-
nant girlfiend, whom he later divorced. Then in May of 1974, the
Defendant married Helen Louise Janis who became his third wife.
17. See State v. Gerhold, No. CT882529X (7thJud. Cir. Ct. Md. Apr. 8, 1999) (ruling on
a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence pursuant to MD. RULE 4-345).
18. See id. at 2-5. Those paragraphs following in the text, which are italicized come
from this same cite.
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In November of 1988, the Baltimore City Police Department ar-
rested a man by the name of Gordon Gaskins for Possession of A
Firearm. After agreeing to cooperate with the authorities, Gaskins
informed the police that Gerhold had made an attempt to solicit him
to murder his first wife, Virginia, in 1968. Because Gaskins was
arrested and incarcerated for a different offense after contracting to
perform the 1968 murder, he was unable to perform the contract kill-
ing on Virginia Gerhold. As a result, the Defendant resorted to hir-
ing someone else to carry out the killing. Although Gaskins was
unable to carry out the 1968 killing of Virginia Gerhold, he admitted
to police that he was currently in negotiations with the Defendant
concerning the possibility of contracting for the murder of his third
wife, Helen Louise Janis Gerhold.
Prince George's County Police shortly thereafter arrested the De-
fendant for the murder of Virginia Gerhold. After his arrest, the
Defendant admitted to having initially hired Gaskins. Upon becom-
ing aware of Gaskins' incapacity as a result of his incarceration to
execute the contract, he later hired an individual known as "Gang-
ster Webster" to kill his first wife. According to the Defendant, he
had paid Gangster Webster $5,000 for the hit. Lee Gerhold then
confessed that he had his first wife murdered in 1968 because of the
pressure he was under from his then pregnant girlfriend to get a
divorce. Because the Defendant believed that a divorce would cause
his friends to look down upon him, he decided to have his wife
murdered.
In 1989 the Defendant was charged and ultimately convicted of
the 1968 murder of his first wife in Prince George's County. He was
thereafter charged with the Solicitation of Murder of his third wife,
Helen Gerhold, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Quite un-
derstandably, Helen Gerhold soon filed for divorce, preferring a more
conventional dissolution of her marriage than that which appeared
historically to be the Defendant's technique of choice to end his mari-
tal relationships.
The investigation into Defendant Lee Drury Gerhold's Solicita-
tion of Murder of Helen Gerhold in Baltimore City revealed taped
conversations between the Defendant and Gaskins, in which a vari-
ety of methods were suggested by Lee Drury Gerhold to eliminate his
third wife. These included the possibility of a drowning or a hit and
run accident. The Defendant rejected the suggestion of a shooting
out offear that it would be too similar to the method used to kill his
first wife. Despite the fact that Lee Drury Gerhold was given two
chances to call off the hit by Gaskins acting as a confidential inform-
ant, he failed to do so.
On December 20, 1988, the defendant, Lee Drury Gerhold was
indicted by a grand jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
[VOL. 59:628
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County, Maryland for the murder of his first wife, Virginia Gerhold. 19
On April 24, the defendant entered a plea of Guilty to Count 1 of the
Indictment, "First Degree Murder as an Accessory Before the Fact."20
On July 11, 1989, the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment of his natural life with all but fifty years suspended, and credit
for time served to that date by the Honorable Judge Howard S.
Chasanow, then sitting as a Judge of the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County.21 On July 18, 1989, a timely Motion for Reduction
of Sentence was filed. On November 21, 1989 an Order of Court, by
Judge Chasanow, was entered, to hold the Motion for Reduction of
Sentence sub curia where it remained for a period of ten years.22
In 1999, the defendant sought mercy from the successors to the
original sentencing judges in both the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County and the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in the form
of reductions of the separately negotiated sentences he received in
both those courts for the murder of his first wife in 1968 and the solic-
itation of the murder of his third wife some twenty years later in
1988.23
III. APPLICATION OF THE ACT TO THE GERHOLD CASE
In early 1990, Judge Howard S. Chasanow, the original sentenc-
ing judge of Lee Drury Gerhold, was elevated to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland. He had previously reserved ruling on the Defendant's
Motion for Reconsideration of his Sentence for the conviction of the
murder of his first wife in 1968. His successor, myself, Judge Steven I.
Platt, made the decision to grant a hearing on the defense's renewed
motion in December 1998. At the hearing, three of the adult children
of Virginia Gerhold, the victim in the case, came forth to offer testi-
mony before the court as to whether their father's sentence should be
19. See State v. Gerhold, No. 18901349 (Baltimore City, 8thJud. Cir. 1989).
20. Id.
21. Id. Judge Chasanow sat on the Court of Appeals of Maryland until August 15, 1999,
when he retired.
22. The defendant also entered a plea in the Baltimore City case before the Honorable
Judge Joseph I. Pines. In this instance, a timely Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence
was also filed and held in abeyance by the court. See Gerhold, No. 18901349.
23. See State v. Gerhold, No. CT882529X, at 6-7 (Md. 7th Jud. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 1999)
(ruling on a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence pursuant to MD. RULE 4-345); State v.
Gerhold, No. 18901349 (Baltimore City, Oct. 20, 1999) (ruling on Motion for Reconsidera-
tion of Sentence pursuant to MD. RULE 4-345, from the bench, with no written opinion
filed).
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reduced.24 The defendant's two daughters offered statements favor-
ing their father's release.25
The Circuit Court for Prince George's County could find no di-
rect guidance on the issue of what weight to give the wishes of the
majority of the deceased victim's children.26 The court therefore, fo-
cused on whether to grant a reduction based upon the statements
made by Gerhold's children.2 7 These siblings, the court noted, could
be viewed as having been either victims of his original crime, because
they lost their mother, or at the very least, family members of the vic-
tim of Gerhold's crime.28
As such, the question became: should the court accord the
wishes of the victim's children, the so-called "victim impact testimony"
enough weight that it would justify applying the Victim's Rights Act in
a manner clearly not contemplated nor even described by anyone in
any legislative history of the Act.29 The answer for the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County was yes because that application was con-
sistent with the Victim's Rights Act-to accord the victim or the vic-
tim's family deference in considering the sentence of the defendant.3"
It was the Circuit Court for Prince George's County's opinion
that the situation warranted turning the traditional justification and
application of the Victim's Rights Act "upside down and inside out."'"
Gerhold's children had already suffered the tragic loss of their mother
and the painful reality of having their own father incarcerated for her
murder. Because the court could find no other reason for Gerhold to
remain incarcerated under the traditional theories of sentencing, it
determined that it would be appropriate to accord greater weight,
than it would have otherwise, to the wishes of Virginia Gerhold's adult
children.3 2
24. See Gerhold, No. CT882529X, at 7-10 (reproducing the testimony of Virginia
Gerhold's two daughters).
25. See id. The transcripted statement of Gerhold's son is not included in the opinion.
26. See id. at 14-15.
27. Id. at 16.
28. Id. The court alternately refers to the daughters of the deceased victim as both
"sibling victims" or "surviving victims," as well as simply the "victim's daughters." Id.
29. See id. ("The facts in the instant case virtually stand ... [the] traditional policy
justifications [of the Victim's Rights Act] on their head.").
30. See supra notes 1, 6 and 10 and accompanying text (providing text of, and discuss-
ing the purposes behind, the Victim's Rights Act).
31. Gerhold, No. CT882529X, at 17.
32. Id. at 19. The court declared it to be quite apparent that its decision on the recon-
sideration of sentence would "neither generally deter nor remove any general deterrence
to others contemplating killing their spouses themselves or hiring someone else to do it."
Id. at 11. Additionally, the court did not feel that "society's condemnation of [the defen-
dant's] most serious and reprehensible crime inherent in his original sentence" would be
[VOL. 59:628
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Had the children's testimony supported continued incarceration,
equal weight would have been given in considering those wishes.33
The children of Virginia Gerhold, however, felt that their father and
they themselves had suffered enough from Gerhold's incarceration.34
In the mind of the court, the benefit, if any, to the further incarcera-
tion of Lee Drury Gerhold in this case was far outweighed by the bur-
den it would continue to have on his children-the victims of the
crime.35 The court, therefore, reluctantly ordered a reduction of the
Defendant's sentence, concluding that there were no means of ex-
tending compassion to his and his deceased wife's children without
granting mercy to Lee Drury Gerhold himself.36 Mercy, the court
stated, of which "he is not entitled to or deserving."37 The Circuit
Court for Prince George's County then went on to explain:
Life was unfair to Virginia Gerhold. Her death was not only
unfair, it was tragic, traumatic and violent beyond any expla-
nation, which this Court can comprehend. This Court's de-
cision not to hold her murderer accountable to the full
extent the law allows is reached very reluctantly. I make that
decision only because I view the alternative which is to main-
tain the status quo as unnecessarily penalizing at least two of
the deceased's children and their families for no reason
other than to satisfy my own personal and abstract theories
of justice. I do not know what Virginia Gerhold would say to
this Court if she were able to address me. I do know she
instilled in all of her children, who are now adults with chil-
dren of their own, an incredible capacity to address the very
seriously compromised. Id. at 12. Regarding rehabilitation as a theory for sentencing, the
court conceded that the question of whether the defendant is "rehabilitated" is not "capa-
ble of being answered to a reasonable degree of certainty in this Defendant's or even this
member of the Court's lifetime." Id. at 13.
33. See id. at 14 (concluding that none of the traditional theories of incarceration (i.e.,
deterrence, denunciation of the act, or rehabilitation) would justify reconsideration of the
defendant's sentence to warrant reduction, and deducing that "the only basis for further
considering Lee Drury Gerhold's request for a reduction . . .is the express desire of his
and two of his deceased wife's daughters that he be released").
34. See id. at 7-10 (providing the testimony of Virginia Gerhold's daughters).
35. The court commented that acceding to the victim's wishes would grant them
greater control over their lives. Id. at 16; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text
(discussing the traditional policy justifications for permitting victim impact statements).
The court, however, also recognized that the only way that they would have this control was
by "injecting [the defendant] back into their lives" and not by the conventional methods of
"punishing the perpetrator of the crime and removing him from society and from the
victims' lives." Gerhold, No. CT882529X, at 16.
36. Gerhold, No. CT882529X (noting that granting the reduced sentence would not "in
the textbook manner, 'satisfy a victim's desire for retribution' in the traditional sense").
37. Id.
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complex and emotional issues before this Court with dignity
and understanding.
The threshold reality is that the risk is minimal that Lee
Drury Gerhold, at the age of 75 and in failing health, will be
a danger to anyone in whatever community he is allowed to
settle in. The further reality is that he may or may not be
"rehabilitated." The final reality is that Lee Drury Gerhold
certainly has not been punished proportionately, but that
two of the five remaining sibling victims of his crime and
their families who were able to speak to this Court asked this
Court to extend mercy to their father notwithstanding the
loss of their mother at his hand. I am sure that they thought
about their decision to speak and write as they did at great
length and after reflection concluded that they were not
dishonoring their mother's memory in doing so. This Court
will therefore not second-guess their decision and I accord it
great weight in reaching my own decision in this case. I also
note that my decision in the instant case will not free this
defendant. In fact he is serving a concurrent sentence as a
result of his plea of guilty, conviction and sentence in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City for solicitation of the mur-
der of his third wife Helen Gerhold. This Court has by this
decision determined not to legally block the Defendant's re-
lease from incarceration in the event that the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City determines for these or other reasons to
reconsider its sentence in the Defendant's companion case
in its jurisdiction.3"
IV. FURTHER ANALYSIS
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City decided not to reconsider its
sentence in the companion case. 39 Judge Martin P. Welch of the Balti-
more City Circuit Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Gerhold's defense counsel to reduce the sentence he was concur-
rently serving for the solicitation of murder of his third wife. 40
A hearing on the matter was held before Judge Welch on Octo-
ber 20, 1999. For the purpose of this hearing, the State produced its
own victim, Gerhold's third wife, in an attempt to lessen the weight
the Judge might accord to the children's wishes.41 Gerhold's third
38. Id. at 18-19.
39. State v. Gerhold, No. 18901349 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1989).
40. Id. Judge Welch denied Gerhold's motion for reconsideration on the bench on
October 20, 1999.
41. Telephone Interview with Fred Bennett, Esq., Defense Attorney for Lee Drury
Gerhold (Oct. 29, 1999).
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wife testified that she was still in fear for her safety.4 2 Upon conclu-
sion of the arguments at the hearing, the Judge denied Gerhold's mo-
tion for a sentence reduction. Here, it appears that Judge Welch
still applied weight to a victim's testimony; only in this case, it was
done in the more traditional manner.4 4
The practical limits, and for that matter, the wisdom of the appli-
cation of the Victim's Rights Act in the non-traditional manner to jus-
tify the reduction of an otherwise appropriate sentence have not to
date been fully explored and have certainly not been articulated in
either legal literature or case law.
The area of family law and domestic violence is one where further
development of the appropriateness of the Act has potential. Con-
sider the situation involving a husband who batters his wife. The wife
initially decides to file charges against her husband and the couple
must appear in court. By the time the designated court date arrives,
one of many things may have occurred. Possibly the husband and wife
have reconciled. Maybe, after having substantial time to think about
it, the wife has come to the realization that if her husband is incarcer-
ated, she will have no way to support herself. In any event, the wife-
the victim in the case-requests leniency on the part of the court.
This example raises a troubling question. Should the judge in
this case apply the Victim's Rights Act to lessen the sentence of the
defendant because failure do so would result in separating a couple
who have happily reconciled, or would it place the wife in a situation
where she has no place to stay and no way to support herself? Is it the
judge's duty to ignore this potential application of the impact state-
ment because the judge believes her own wisdom and experience in
the domestic violence arena dictate otherwise? Ajudge may choose to
ignore the victim's impact statement expressing a request for leniency
toward her husband because she believes that in the long run it is in
the victim's best interest to incarcerate the batterer. Is this applica-
tion of the victim's impact statement, or lack there of, any more justifi-
able than the manner in which it was applied by the Prince George's
County Circuit Court to the facts in the Gerhold case?
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. The traditional manner entails consideration of the testimony of the victim, or the
deceased victim's family, regarding the psychological impact that the crime has had on the
victim or on the family members. See supra text accompanying note 15. The Baltimore City
Circuit Court followed this approach to the extent that it considered the testimony of
Gerhold's third wife.
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Child abuse is yet another situation where the consideration of an
impact statement might act to assist a defendant in receiving a less-
ened sentenced.45 A father has repeatedly abused his children, yet
once in court, the children plead with the judge to allow their father
to go free, yet they face a future of foster homes and potential separa-
tion. The children are the victims of a violent act. Thus, the legisla-
tion allows for them to make a statement at the time of sentencing
and the judge "must" give it due consideration. Should the judge ig-
nore the statement because he knows the violence and abuse the kids
face far outweigh the drawbacks of foster care or should the judge give
consideration to the request and demonstrate leniency toward the
defendant?
An entirely different arena where judges are in reality already us-
ing a victim's statement to benefit the defendant is in the sentencing
of defendants convicted for white-collar crime offenses. For example,
consider a situation involving the crime of embezzlement on the part
of an accountant employed by a small family-owned business. The
State prosecutes the accountant, and the prosecutor requests the max-
imum penalty. However, the victims in the case-the family that owns
the business-plead with the court to allow the defendant to serve
time on the weekends so that she will be able to work and to pay back
restitution to the victims. Incarcerating the defendant in a situation
such as this could actually cause further harm and suffering to the
victims should their business go bankrupt when they are unable to
collect money owed by the defendant. It is the situation today, where
judges already allow for just such an arrangement to keep victims of
embezzlement from suffering the loss of their businesses. This ar-
rangement, in reality reflects the application of the Victim's Rights Act
in a parallel fashion to how it was applied in the Gerhold case. In both
situations, a defendant receives a lesser sentence so that a victim does
not endure further harm or emotional suffering.46
45. For example, in State v. Lucas, No. CT991495X (7th Jud. Cir. Ct. Md. Feb. 29,
2000), a trial judge imposed a sentence of probation on a child abuse case after hearing a
victim impact statement requesting no incarceration because the defendant was the vic-
tim's cousin. Judge Graydon S. McKee, III stated for the record that he was giving consid-
eration to the victim's mother's statement. See id.
46. Cf State v. Whitlock, No. CT98-130X (7thJud. Cir. Md. Dec. 2, 1998) (imposing a
sentence of five years with all but eighteen months suspended on a defendant who embez-
zled over $150,000 so that she could obtain employment and pay back restitution to the
victim).
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CONCLUSION
The remaining question is how and to what extent should the
Victim's Rights Act be applied in a way that is fair to both the victim of
a crime and to the defendant convicted of committing that crime.
Certainly, there is no debate over the ultimate purpose of the Victim's
Rights Act, which is to give greater weight and consideration to the
interests and desires of the victim in the case.47 The wisdom of doing
so remains unclear and, therefore, is the subject of considerable de-
bate. There is clearly no consensus in either academic or judicial cir-
cles on the issue.
It is difficult to surmise how many sentencing judges may already
be using the Act in this manner because many may do so without mak-
ing a record of the reasons for their sentencing decision. It is likely
that many have applied the Act subconsciously in a way similar to
those mentioned in the previous hypotheticals. There are currently
no Maryland appellate opinions that attempt to set or to define the
parameters of the Victim's Rights Act. If sentencing judges are going
to apply the Act regularly, as they are doing now, then it is apparent
that there should be further thought and discussion both academi-
cally and in case law on what, if any, limitations should be applied to
that use.
47. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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